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12 September 1967

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Comments on NSC Agenda for 13 September 1967

1. We are in general accord with the attached State Department memorandum setting forth the outlook for the 22nd UN General Assembly and the major issues it will face.

Moscow may have to perform a difficult balancing act in the GA this fall. An effective defense of the US-Soviet draft nonproliferation treaty (NPT) will call for close bilateral collaboration. Cross-cutting pressures on Soviet diplomacy, however, require that Moscow avoid public displays of cooperation with the US. Therefore the Soviets will probably offset their cooperation on the NPT with a good deal of anti-American posturing in public.

We have a few specific comments, offered for clarification or additional information.

2. Middle East (p. 1): Recent intelligence suggests that the Soviets have not yet developed a firm position on the full range of Middle East questions that could come before the UNGA. The Soviet Ambassador to the US said in Moscow last week that it was not clear how these questions would be handled. He avoided the subject of the resolution Moscow and the US worked out late in the emergency UNGA this summer. We believe that the negative outcome of the emergency session will make Moscow reluctant to take the lead on the Middle East question this fall.

3. Vietnam (p. 1): In the past week Hanoi has reaffirmed its negative attitude toward UN involvement in the Vietnam issue. We expect Moscow and the Communist Bloc to continue to support Hanoi's position.

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We also believe that should some country inscribe Vietnam on the GA agenda, as distinct from the Security Council agenda, there would be considerable risk of an adverse resolution on this item, specifically one calling for the suspension of US bombing as a first step toward negotiations. In the past, Vietnam has not been on the GA agenda due to big power opposition.

4. Non-Proliferation Treaty (p. 2): The new Soviet compromise proposal has improved the outlook for agreement on Article 3 on safeguards. In the circumstances, the US and USSR are probably willing to keep the ENDC going until October in the hope of such an agreement prior to turning the draft treaty over to the GA for consideration. (Incidentally, the State paper makes no reference to any US plans to discuss other arms control proposals, e.g., registry of arms shipments to the Middle East.)

5. South West Africa (p. 3): We strongly doubt that the UN, with or without adopting more forceful measures, can discourage Pretoria from establishing a "bantustan" in South West Africa.

6. Rhodesia (p. 4): The Africans are again likely to demand sanctions against South Africa, with the intention of getting at Rhodesia. While there is some indication that the UK might be agreeable to some extension of sanctions against Rhodesia, it will almost certainly not accept sanctions against South Africa.

7. Chinese Representation (p. 4): We expect Soviet support for seating Communist China again to be pro forma and perfunctory. Some of the countries who rocked the boat last year, e.g. Canada and Italy, have said they probably would not be taking any initiative on the issue.

8. Korea: The paper omits any reference to Korea, although the agenda already includes the Korean question, i.e., the report of the UN Commission for

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the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK), and a Soviet call for withdrawal of foreign forces from South Korea. The US and ROK hope that the Korean items will come at the very end of the session, or even be postponed to the next GA. Postponement is unlikely, and the Korean debate, whenever it occurs, could be quite troublesome. The Soviets may push their withdrawal item strongly to make up for their setbacks in the Middle East and might pick up some votes for this item. Also there is the risk of some slippage in support of ROK position among the Africans resulting from the effectiveness of North Korean efforts to woo them. Some of the moderate Arabs, because of Soviet persuasion and resentment at the US over the Middle East, might support a two-Korea seating formula.

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MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director

Attached are our comments on the agenda for the NSC meeting on 13 September.

OOB 13 September. You may find this memo useful as a handout for the NSC meeting.

  
Ed Proctor  
12 September  
(DATE)

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